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Getting Power Back: Court Restoration of Executive Authority in 
Boston City Government 
 
This article, originally published in 1985, is based partly on the author’s experience with the 
Boston school desegregation case, but goes beyond it. It chronicles some of the events that 
occurred when a state and a federal court attempted to disengage from active jurisdiction over 
two Boston public systems: the Boston Public Schools and the Boston Housing Authority. It 
makes three proposals, which, if enacted, would help to keep the courts out of day-to-day 
management of municipal operations. It also makes some generalizations about the court-agency 
interplay that are relevant to the post-remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. The 
author uses the term “restorative law” to describe this court-controlled process of returning 
power to the executive branch. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Within Boston, a transition has occurred regarding the governance and management of public 
services. There is a new structure for the City Council and School Committee and a new 
administration team in City Hall and School Department headquarters. A populist air surrounds 
municipal government; terms like openness and access are used to describe what was previously 
viewed as an insiders’ club. 
Besides the changes in representation and mood, another kind of transition has occurred in 
local government-one that is intergovernmental and pertains to the relationship between the 
courts and the executive branch. Over the past year, the city’s administration has recovered power 
from the courts to manage two major segments of municipal operations: Boston’s public housing 
and its public schools. 
The restoration of administrative authority, autonomy, and accountability is part of an 
executive recovery process that occurs in the post-remedial phase of institutional reform 
litigation. In place of a bifurcated decision-making structure, divided between courtrooms and 
corner offices with their different sets of rules and procedures, the recovery of executive power 
reestablishes a single structure for implementing public policy. Since this change takes place as 
the result of court action and final decrees, the concept of “restorative law” is used. Restorative 
law refers to the executive recovery process; in its broadest context, the concept applies to the 
process by which defendants in institutional reform cases demonstrate both the commitment and 
capacity to operate a system in compliance with the law. 
This article will treat the issue of executive recovery by advancing the concept of restorative 
law as it applies to Boston city government. A sketch of historical and contextual factors relevant 
to the judicial activism debate will be drawn to facilitate an understanding of the controversy, and 
the special nature of court entry into Boston city services will be described. The article will then 
identify some of the forces at work that contribute to the executive recovery process and will 
outline some of the basic conditions of court disengagement from the public housing and public 
school system. In addition to outlining actions that reduce judicial management activity, this 
article will make a series of propositions which can help assure that the courts will not have to 
reassert their influence within the Boston public administrative realm. Put plainly, this analysis 
will specify general conditions conducive to getting the courts out of the business of day-to-day 
management of public affairs, and will identify actions which help assure that they don’t have to 
get back in. 
 
Background and Historical Context 
More than any other big city, Boston is characterized by a shadow system of government: 
courtrooms serve as policy-making arenas in addition to corner offices and council or  
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committee chambers. Many attribute this to a parochial definition of the public interest and sense 
of ethical responsibility held by many local officials. The management of public affairs through 
the issuance of remedial court decrees, however, became a special phenomenon of the 1970s and 
1980s throughout the country. In part due to the unwillingness or inability of public officials to 
discharge their duties in a manner consistent with expanding interpretations of constitutional 
rights, and in part due to greater procedural access to public law litigation activity, the growth of 
so-called judicial activism has blurred the boundaries among the legislative and administrative 
branches of government. 
Especially since the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
1
 the use of 
court-prescribed corrective measures issued to institutions in which constitutional violations are 
found to exist has complicated the role of agency managers and subjected the judiciary to a great 
deal of criticism. The equitable remedial powers of a court, when exercised over public policy 
disputes, often take the form of affirmative decrees that create some form of institutional power 
realignment.
2
 
To some, this judicial behavior is a proper response to the shortcomings of legislative and 
executive behavior. To others, such behavior represents judicial overreaching and an attack on the 
very structure of democratic government. 
Within the city of Boston, there are several examples of direct court involvement in the 
resolution of public policy disputes. Since the mid-1960s, federal or state courts have played a 
role in matters pertaining to school desegregation; education for children with special needs or 
possessing limited English-speaking ability; public housing; prisoners’ rights as affected by 
facilities at the Charles Street Jail and the Deer Island House of Correction; municipal finance, 
dramatically represented by state court involvement in the so-called Tregor dispute of 1981; 3 and 
environmental conditions within Boston Harbor. 
The resultant forms of court intervention, most visibly displayed in the cases affecting the 
Boston School Department, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), and the Boston Harbor, 
followed extended periods of attempts to settle disputes through appeals to legislative or 
administrative action.4 Following legislative or administrative inaction, or inappropriate action, 
the courts became ineluctably drawn into public administration. Once in, they stayed in: The 
remedial phase of the Boston school desegregation case is in its eleventh year; the receivership 
affecting the BHA lasted five years. 
 
The Courts’ New Role: The Judge as Manager 
The institutional reform aspect of these cases in particular, and judicial activism in general, raises 
questions about the validity of the courts’ entry into political and administrative realms. The 
debate over judicial activism centers around two primary issues: the propriety or legitimacy of the 
courts’ new role, given the separation of powers doctrine contained in the United States 
Constitution; and the efficacy or capacity of the courts, as an institution, to carry out 
responsibilities that are extrajudicial. In either case, the critical response to judicial activism often 
is further divided into concerns based on principles and axioms or partisan disagreements over 
the policy outcomes (such as school busing) of judicial decision making.4 
 
The Boston Cases and Governmental Abdication 
Before turning to the issue of restoring authority for managing the public’s business to Boston’s 
mayor, City Council, and School Committee, it is important to begin with an  understanding of 
the special character of judicial intervention. 
Neither of the two judges Garrity—Paul and Arthur—retained active jurisdiction over the 
BHA or the School Department because he had nothing better to do or because he had a secret 
yearning for public administration. Despite their differences in manner and temperament, each 
Judge Garrity took pains to facilitate a resolution of plaintiff grievances without the necessity of 
direct court involvement.5 
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In the Findings, Rulings, Opinion and Orders in Perez v. Boston Housing Authority of July 
25, 1979, the court took note of “the history of this case and the repeated efforts by the [Plaintiff 
Class of] Tenants over the years in seeking and in following up every remedy short of 
receivership in order to obtain safe, sanitary and decent housing as mandated by law.”6 Neither 
the presence and good efforts of a master (and staff) to perform services on behalf of tenants, nor 
the consent decree entered on May 31, 1977, resulted in any significant change in housing 
conditions for the city’s poor. Therefore, the court turned to the only remedy that had not yet been 
attempted: the appointment of a receiver who would have full authority to administer, manage, 
and operate the BHA, with control over BHA funds and revenues. The existing BHA’s Board of 
Commissioners was stripped of its powers. Following an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
which it approved the appointment of a receiver, Judge Paul Garrity appointed Lewis H. Spence 
as receiver on February 5, 1980. 
By 1984, the achievements wrought by Harry Spence and the staff of the Housing Authority 
were considered remarkable, both for their contributions to managerial effectiveness and because 
they helped ignite the public spirit on matters pertaining to housing. These achievements, 
however, might not have been possible had it not been for the sanctions provided by the 
receivership. The receiver’s court-ordered responsibilities could be carried out without the 
encumbrances of a five-member appointed board and in spite of the reluctance of other public 
officials to tackle housing issues. For the duration of Judge Garrity’s receivership (the court 
retained its jurisdiction until late 1984), the board was prevented from exercising any authority. 
The receiver enjoyed the benefits of autonomy, felt especially in purchasing and personnel 
areas. Both figuratively speaking and literally, the task of rebuilding an organization was carried 
out brick by brick. The development and installation of modern management systems, the 
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, the fostering of a preventive approach to capital 
maintenance, the implementation of performance evaluation systems tied to merit salary 
increases—these internal initiatives, in the words of one BHA senior staffer, “have one common 
thread:  
 
We’re attempting to get career employees and the rank and file to buy into what 
we’re doing. They have an opportunity to be involved, and hopefully don’t have 
the impression that we’re trying to impose. 
 
The benefits of the receivership were then noted by the same individual: 
 
The political insulation has been quite useful insofar as management system 
developments and morale-related achievements [are concerned]. This doesn’t 
mean that we didn’t have to discuss things with the public or negotiate with the 
union, but the removal of the impediment was useful. 
 
A different pattern of court-agency relations emerged in Morgan v. Hennigan, the school 
desegregation case. Following the liability opinion of June 21, 1974,7 the Student Desegregation 
Plan—the first in a series of over 400 remedial orders—was issued by U.S. District Court Judge 
W. Arthur Garrity Jr., on May 10, 1975.8 The scope and sweep of the court’s jurisdiction were 
unprecedented: Although Judge Garrity utilized remedial guidelines set forth in the Denver 
school desegregation case,9 the Boston orders were unique and provoked well-known controversy 
at the local, state, and national level. The raw and noisy politicization and polarization 
experienced in Phase I and Phase II of the desegregation plan, punctuated by changes in the 
superintendency, by School Committee judicial appeals, and by extensive media coverage, 
reached its zenith with the partial receivership imposed on South Boston High School on 
December 9, 1975.10 
 The breadth and depth of the court’s intervention came to dominate all aspects of 
educational policy-making and practice within the School Department. The bureaucratic labyrinth 
of School Department operations, coupled with the reluctance of department officials to carry out 
any responsibilities in connection with desegregation unless they were specifically ordered by the 
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court, contributed to a gradual displacement of administrative authority. Public opposition to 
busing, reinforced by the actions of many local officials, became directed to the federal court for 
“taking over” the school system. 
Through administrative default, the court became more involved with management activities. 
This involvement, however, was not as extensive as many portrayed it to be; the level of detail 
and the scope of authority contained in the court’s orders, from the summer of 1975 and 
continuing through the years, varied from issue to issue. Some orders were broad, leaving a great 
deal of administrative discretion to the School Department. Other orders were quite specific, 
representing judicial usurpation of administrative authority. 
In retrospect, there continues to be disagreement as to the judicial style employed during the 
remedial regime: Some claim that Judge Garrity went too far in the use of his authority; others 
claim that he did not go far enough. My assessment is that both conclusions are true. As a result, 
there always was a question as to where administrative authority ended and judicial authority 
began. 
A well-known feature of the Boston case is that the character of Judge Garrity’s intervention 
incorporated educational as well as equity concerns. The creation of magnet schools and 
institutional pairings, the orders pertaining to vocational-occupational education, the partial 
receivership imposed on South Boston High School, and the establishment of parent advisory 
councils all were designed to reform the school system and infuse it with much-needed vitality. 
These reforms supplemented the other remedial tools—racial composition, school or district 
consolidation, and transportation—used by the court. 
There were managerial byproducts, however, of the court’s intervention that affected the 
capacity of the School Department to carry out its educational mission. Even though the earlier 
phase of resistance and hostility eventually gave way to greater acceptance of court-ordered 
responsibilities, a pattern of administrative dependency set in. Owing both to the erosion of 
authority and limited professional capabilities, the School Department came to rely on the court 
for directives and, in some cases, used the court to further its own policy or political aims.  
Consistent with the political science maxim that institutions in conflict over time begin to 
look and act alike,11 the court became entangled with the administrative mechanism it sought to 
cure, and the School Department became entangled with the principled incrementalism of the 
advocacy process. A cycle of dependence ensued, and a sort of “psyching out the court” 
syndrome developed. The department became more passive as the court, since it recognized that 
its orders were not necessarily self-executing, became more deeply drawn into managerial 
operations. The orders accumulated and became more detailed. 
The appointment of Robert C. Wood as superintendent in 1978 marked a turning point in the 
court-agency relationship. While progress toward achieving the court’s remedial objectives had 
been made under the leadership of Marion Fahey, Wood’s predecessor as superintendent, the 
Wood administration sought, via its mandate for reorganization, to achieve voluntary compliance 
with many of the major court orders because the court’s remedial objectives were shared. 
Expected judicial reaction became only one of the many factors considered in the administrative 
decision making and implementation process. From the court’s perspective, many of the 
extrajudicial factors with which it concerned itself earlier now were viewed, more or less, as 
forces to be managed by school officials.  
Despite Wood’s firing in the summer of 1980, there continued to be progress within the 
School Department toward compliance with outstanding orders; and despite occasional anti-court 
outbursts and criminal problems associated with contract-fixing, the School Committee displayed 
a concern for stability and quality in educational operations, a concern that was to become 
conducive to and reënforced by the promise of court withdrawal. Especially with the election of 
two black members in the fall of 1981, the governance structure and administrative operations of 
the Boston public schools became quite different from what existed in 1974 and 1975. 
By the time of the city elections of 1983, a succession of actions occurred that set the stage 
for the restoration of administrative authority for the School Department and the Housing 
Authority. Both judges Garrity signaled their desire to terminate their active jurisdiction and, with 
regard to the public schools, began to do so. 
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The School Case 
Four years ago, in May of 1981—six years after the issuance of the Student Desegregation 
Plan—Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr., made known his desire to terminate active jurisdiction in the 
Morgan case. The pending departure of former state Commissioner of Education Gregory Anrig, 
who provided consistently strong and articulate leadership during most of the court’s 
involvement, helped to stimulate a negotiation process designed to produce proposals for final 
court orders.
12
 
Because of the court’s tendency to view the State Board of Education as an important force 
in overseeing local school district compliance, the pending change in state leadership provided an 
opportune time to initiate what was termed a consent decree process, that is, a negotiating 
procedure designed to produce a series of proposals for final court orders.
13
 Indeed, the State 
Board already had discussed the implications of federal court withdrawal. In January of 1979, 
Commissioner Anrig outlined a possible state monitoring role, should the court decide to reduce 
its involvement. The court was well aware of these earlier suggestions for an expanded State 
Board role and viewed them favorably. For a variety of reasons, by the spring of 1981, the court 
was willing to respond to the state’s overtures. 
In June of 1981, Commissioner Anrig consulted with his board and his staff about the 
conditions of a viable consent decree process. In that same month, preliminary meetings were 
held with counsel representing the nine different parties to the case.
14
 Immediately prior to his 
departure from office, Commissioner Anrig sent a letter to Judge Garrity in which he expressed 
his personal views regarding two criteria for a successful consent decree process: 
 
For a consent decree process to become a reality, however, the key parties will first 
have to demonstrate the same kind of good faith and cooperation in the 
development of a recommended consent decree that will be essential for such a 
final decree to be implemented. A good beginning has been made but the most 
difficult decisions lie ahead. . . . On the basis of my experience in school 
desegregation, I do not believe we will find much precedent for the kind of final 
consent decree or final order needed in the Morgan case. The parties as well as the 
Court will have to be willing to set precedent.15 
 
For the next twenty months, from May 1981 to January 1983, the so-called consent decree 
process took place under the direction of then-Special Assistant District Attorney General Robert 
H. Bohn Jr. Finally, on December 23, 1982, the court issued its plan for disengagement, which 
contained the following major provisions: 
 a transitional phase of State Board monitoring of school and city defendants’ 
compliance with the court’s desegregation orders and voluntary desegregation 
measures; 
 a process of dispute resolution with the objective of agreement rather than 
adjudication; 
 a process of mediation whereby, in cases in which the parties fail to reach 
agreement after negotiation efforts, the State Board would intervene and attempt 
to facilitate agreement; 
 a mechanism whereby, should mediation fail to produce an agreement, the State 
Board would be empowered to prepare a binding recommendation of resolution; 
 an “ultimate judicial stopgap” (that is, judicial resolution), should the process of 
consensual resolution fail;  
 a process to propose modifications of outstanding court orders; and 
 a mechanism for further judicial withdrawal after January 1, 1985, based on a 
prima facie showing of successful implementation of the transitional 
administrative processes.  
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In its cover memorandum, the court stated that an abiding aim of the desegregation plan was 
consensual resolution, consistent with the earlier hope of entering a final consent decree: 
 
The court regards the adversarial judicial process as inhibitive of an ideally 
functioning school system in which compliance with constitutional standards is 
both voluntary and a matter of course. The process of dispute resolution prescribed 
by these orders is intended to create a framework for facilitating the consensual 
resolution of disputes related to the desegregation remedy. This framework is not a 
substitute for judicial action, but a screen prior to judicial action, to assure that all 
possible efforts have been expended toward a satisfactory resolution . . . . [T]he 
remedial process, in our opinion, will now be more effectively pursued under an 
administrative structure which employs the experience and the common 
understanding gained over the years, and which provides the parties with an 
opportunity to confront and resolve issues related to curing the constitutional 
violation without immediate and inevitable judicial participation.16  
 
Legal Squabbling: Quality and Equality 
The 1982 Memorandum and Orders of Disengagement capped months of proposals and 
counterproposals made among the twelve attorneys who met, sometimes with School Department 
or State Board policy staff, on a regular basis. During the course of the consent decree 
proceedings, however, a series of legal and extralegal events took place which influenced 
bargaining direction, pace, and position: 
 A new superintendent of schools, Robert Spillane, and a new commissioner of 
education, John Lawson, were appointed in the summer and winter of 1981, 
respectively; 
 The counsel for black plaintiffs, an attorney named Larry Johnson from 
Harvard’s Center for Law and Education, withdrew from the consent decree 
proceedings and publicly denounced them, claiming his clients’ interests were 
not being served. Mr. Johnson stated his intent to work with black parents in the 
design and submission of a voluntary student assignment plan emphasizing 
educational quality rather than racial balance;  
 Boston voters approved a referendum expanding the governance structure of the 
School Committee and City Council;  
 School Committee President Jean Sullivan McKeigue initiated an educational 
planning process in the summer of 1982, involving parent and community 
representatives, to supplement the consent decree negotiations (the group was 
known as the Educational Planning Group); and  
 The Boston Compact was developed, constituting an agreement between chief 
executive officers in the Boston business community and the School Department 
to provide jobs for high school graduates. 
The conditions of proper judicial authority were attended to in a decision handed down by 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in September of 1981. In an opinion pertaining to school 
closings, the Appeals Court upheld Judge Garrity’s rulings but advised that the lower court’s 
future decisions should more clearly relate to desegregation than to educational issues.17 
In addition to influencing the actions of the attorneys engaged in the consent decree process, 
these managerial, political, educational, social, and legal forces formed a backdrop to the court’s 
deliberations and actions concerning disengagement. Without describing the full effect of these 
forces, of particular significance was the visible split within plaintiff class. 
Upon the withdrawal of plaintiff counsel, Thomas Atkins, formerly of Boston and recent 
general counsel for the NAACP (one of the original parties filing the complaint), filed a motion 
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with the court seeking permission to appear as a counsel for black plaintiffs. Judge Garrity’s 
response was to let both Larry Johnson and Thomas Atkins represent plaintiffs in the consent 
decree proceedings. Each attorney claimed to represent plaintiffs’ interests, but each had different 
objectives for court disengagement: Mr. Johnson’s objective was a student assignment plan based 
on voluntary choice, and Mr. Atkins’s was the continuation of mandatory assignments, albeit with 
some refinement. 
The split within plaintiff class created repercussions throughout the community and affected 
the negotiation process among the attorneys; but the internal disagreements over the nature of the 
remedy appropriate to Boston were not new. 
One segment of the black community preferred integration and improvement of educational 
quality as a method of redressing the grievances cited by plaintiff class. This approach to 
desegregation was advocated by those attorneys who filed the original complaint back in 1972. 
Another segment of the black community preferred educational improvements whether or not the 
schools were desegregated. Racial mixing was not viewed as the primary remedy to the problem 
of denial of access to educational quality; an infusion of resources to educationally deficient 
schools was considered to be a more effective solution. As Derrick Bell and Ronald Edmonds 
point out, this fundamental difference over policy persists throughout the history of desegregation 
cases.18 Therefore, the breach between Mr. Atkins and Mr. Johnson was partially grounded in 
historical precedent. 
Many thoughtful observers, however, considered the public position taken by Mr. Johnson as 
a natural outgrowth of Judge Garrity’s remedial plan. Were it not for the racial balance aspects of 
the court’s numerous orders, which created a foundation of equity from which changes in 
attitudes and behavior could occur, it might be more difficult to argue persuasively for remedies 
that did not include racial mixing as a factor. For some, Mr. Johnson’s pronouncements 
concerning the development of a voluntary student assignment plan were interpreted as a logical 
next step in the lengthy process of achieving quality education in a non­ discriminatory 
environment. For others, though, his actions were viewed as a defection from the ranks of those 
committed to educational equality. His position, since it contradicted the legal position originally 
held by plaintiff black parents, raised a question as to whether the Morgan case continued to 
represent the legitimate concerns of all parents. 
 
Transitional Authority: The Road to Recovery 
In spite of the procedural uncertainty inherent in the consent decree proceedings, as well as 
questions about the legitimate representation of clients’ interests, the parties produced various 
working papers and draft proposals throughout 1981 and 1982. There was no submission, 
however, of a single document representing the parties’ proposal for final orders. 
After a series of judicial decision points made in response to a variety of circumstances and 
conditions, Judge Garrity issued his final order for disengagement in the Boston public schools.
19
 
The court perceived its efforts to promote a consent decree as failing; these orders were intended 
to return responsibility for protecting the rights of black and other minority parents and 
schoolchildren to the community and School Committee. The court’s orders created mechanisms 
for monitoring School Department compliance with desegregation and for third-party dispute 
resolution that vastly reduced the need for direct judicial involvement. In delegating primary 
responsibilities for monitoring and dispute resolution over the next three years to the State Board 
of Education, the stage was set for a return to administrative normalcy. 
In a transitional sense, though, the road to recovery meant a change in the relationship 
between the city and the state: at the least, the expanded State Board role required an increase in 
the level of interaction with the School Department. In its 1982 order, the court required the State 
Board to submit a written report to the court, parties, and Citywide Parents Council by January 15 
and July 15 of each year the disengagement order remains in effect. In a sense, one form of 
dependence was replaced by another. 
In carrying out its court-ordered responsibilities, the State Board made every effort to be as 
unobtrusive as possible. The good-faith efforts emanating from both the State Department of 
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Education and the School Department represented a departure from an earlier era of suspicion 
and mistrust. Heightened knowledge of School Department operations, coupled with a greater 
willingness to cooperate in responding to requests for information, data, and reports, contributed 
to a state-local relationship marked by collaboration rather than control. 
Adding to the involvement of the State Board of Education in School Department activities 
was the appointment of two new members with local ties. Mary Ellen Smith and Loretta Roache 
joined the board in 1984 and brought with them a great deal of knowledge and sensitivity about 
the desegregation case. In some instances, their presence affected the philosophy and direction of 
the State Board; for example, the board became more overtly critical of the court in late 1984 and 
revised its own monitoring procedures to make them less detailed and more broadly consultative. 
Nevertheless, the intent of the federal court was that there be an interim period for bringing 
the case to a close and that the monitoring role of the State Board, as outlined in 1982, be 
temporary. While the board continued to generate monitoring reports, the court continued to 
reduce its role. In early 1985, the court terminated its jurisdiction in several areas in which 
remedial orders were entered, including special education, bilingual education, the institutional 
pairings, and student/school safety. It also approved modifications of the student desegregation 
plan advanced by school defendants, most notably those creating an experimental district with 
greater flexibility in student assignments. 
 
The Restoration of Executive Control: The Court Closes the Case 
In July of 1985, Judge Garrity issued his long-awaited draft final judgment for closing the 
desegregation case.
20
 In this memorandum he cited several factors, similar to those referenced in 
December 1982, for his action: 
 The parties’ infrequent use of the dispute resolution process during the interim 
period suggested a “common understanding of rights and responsibilities under 
the remedial plan’’; 
 The apparent willingness of the new thirteen-member School Committee to 
implement the remedial plan; 
 The strong public commitment of Boston Mayor Raymond L. Flynn to 
educational excellence and desegregation; 
 The 88.5 percentage level of pupil attendance during the 1985 school year, 
which was the highest since 1970–71; and 
 The monitoring reports generated by the State Board, which provided an 
appraisal of progress made and steps to be taken to fulfill the requirements of 
the remedial plan.
21  
Judge Garrity also described the experience of proposing modifications to the desegregation 
plan. Although there were several disparate initiatives for modifying the plan throughout 1984, 
none was cohesive enough to be subjected to the formal modification process. By December 20, 
1984, however, the School Department proposed a series of modifications to final court orders. 
Following negotiations among the parties, eight of the eleven proposed modifications were 
adopted by the court, in early 1985. 
At a court hearing on August 7, 1985, the court outlined a set of principles that would be 
used to measure School Department performance. The court’s intent was to provide the 
department with discretionary authority to carry out its administrative responsibilities without 
judicial oversight. This done, Judge Garrity finally ended the court’s involvement in the school 
case when he issued his final orders on September 3, 1985. These orders returned to the School 
Committee the authority to run Boston’s public schools. 
Clearly, the circumstances, structure, and individuals affecting the Boston public schools 
have changed since the liability finding of 1974. While one cannot make the claim that racism 
has been eradicated (centuries of conflict cannot be remedied in a decade), few can dispute the 
progress of the department, in both attitude and action, toward achieving desegregation. In short, 
the school system has regained the right to manage its own affairs. 
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Ironically, this restoration of local executive authority has occurred at a time when state 
government is beginning to play a more prominent role. The educational reform bill signed into 
law by Governor Michael S. Dukakis in July 1985 broadened the authority of the state to provide 
incentives for educational excellence. Other trends—such as the devolution of the federal 
governmental role, the limitations on school district authority imposed by Proposition 2½, 
continued public concern with, and interest in, the quality of education, and increased demand for 
accountability and performance standards—contribute to the expansion of the state’s influence 
over local district operations. For now, however, the opportunity exists for the Boston public 
schools to demonstrate that the recovery of its executive power is warranted. Judge Garrity 
seemed to feel that it is; if he didn’t, he would have retained active judicial oversight or 
transferred the court’s authority to the state. 
The final section draws some general conclusions about the optimal process of 
disengagement. In attempting to specify basic conditions for the return of agency authority, the 
experience of the Boston Housing Authority is used as well. Both Boston cases—differing with 
respect to style and scope of judicial intervention, focus of policy, and organizational 
characteristics—serve to illuminate more general principles for public management. 
 
The Boston Housing Authority Case 
Although the process for withdrawal was neither as formal nor as public as that affecting the 
School Department, former superior court judge Paul G. Garrity withdrew active jurisdiction over 
the BHA in late 1984. “I’m not ‘sick and tired’ or desperate to get rid of it, but all good things 
have to come to an end,” he stated prior to his action. “I’m predisposed to withdraw because I 
think the other branches [of government] should be permitted to assume responsibility for the 
operations of the BHA and be held accountable.”22 His desire to go into private practice also 
contributed to his decision. 
Harry Spence resigned as receiver in the fall of 1984 to return to the private sector. Mayor 
Flynn appointed former state representative Doris Bunte as his successor in November of 1984. 
Because of Ms. Bunte’s experience with and commitment to public housing, her appointment was 
greeted enthusiastically by the court and the community. 
 
The Development of System Capacity 
There have been many accomplishments since the receivership was imposed on the Authority six 
years ago. The progress in such areas as vacancy reduction, rehabilitation, tenant selection, fiscal 
management, and security are partly the result of the day-to-day efforts of the receiver and his or 
her staff to create a climate of professionalism, thus enabling managerial capability and a sense of 
pride to emerge. The gains made in the provision and maintenance of low-income housing in 
Boston, however, are not just the result of the actions of committed and capable individuals. 
They are also an outgrowth of the special kind of autonomy the receivership afforded. As 
pointed out earlier in this article, the receiver was endowed with extraordinary powers relative to 
the operations of a highly politicized system. Without the encumbrances of a politically appointed 
board and with such benefits as centralized authority, the BHA has been able to make real 
improvements in the provision of housing for the poor. 
Historically, the BHA was a stepchild of City Hall, with diffuse control and little 
administrative or political support. Currently celebrating its fiftieth anniversary year, the BHA 
now reports directly to the mayor, with a much broader base of administrative and political 
support. A special concern, however, is the extent to which the public housing function can be 
effectively discharged without relying too heavily on goodwill or political favoritism. 
This is an interim period, then, for the BHA. While the executive administrator reports 
directly to the mayor, no final organizational plan has been adopted. In fact, there is some 
disagreement as to the best structure for governance and oversight. One view is that an oversight 
committee, comprised of tenants, should be delegated responsibilities for monitoring BHA 
operations. This position is strongly advocated by Tenants United for Public Housing Progress, a 
tenants’ rights group that has done important work organizing resident task forces at the local 
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project level. 
An alternative view is that the public housing function should be integrated with other 
housing and development functions in City Hall. In this model, the BHA would not occupy a 
direct reporting relationship to the mayor. Organizationally, it would be placed at the same 
middle-management level with other offices, such as economic development, community 
development, construction and preservation, and public facilities, under the jurisdiction of a 
senior official reporting directly to the mayor.
23
 
For now, the BHA continues its work and continues to make progress in such areas as 
resident participation and decision making, labor relations, code compliance, and desegregation. 
The post-receivership state did not result in uncertainty and confusion, as some observers feared 
it would. Under Doris Bunte’s leadership, the process of improving performance, 
professionalizing tasks, perfecting newly developed management systems, and upgrading morale 
has continued. 
 
Normalizing Race Relations: The Unfinished Agenda 
Perhaps the greatest vulnerability in the tenure of the receivership is the issue of race relations. 
There currently are three housing developments that remain segregated. As the City resumes 
administrative control over the operations of the BHA, it becomes subject to the equity 
requirements of state and federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions. Should these 
segregated conditions not change, chances are that new lawsuits will be filed. 
The receivership, with its alliance to the court, acted as a buffer in helping to resolve racial 
problems. The Authority therefore was able to employ persuasion rather than confrontation and 
encouraged a voluntary approach to dispute resolution. One major example of this mode of 
operation was the desegregation of the Charlestown and South Boston developments. After a 
year’s discussion, minority families moved peaceably into Charlestown in February of 1984. 
There is no question that the full support and backing of Mayor Flynn was needed to help assure 
the peaceable desegregation of Charlestown. Indeed, the full support of many city and 
neighborhood officials was necessary. The extent to which such support continues to be 
forthcoming, as well as the relative success of the Charlestown experience, will affect continued 
autonomy. Stated one official, “The Authority would have failed if Charlestown didn’t work.” 
 
Structural Implications and Resources Requirements 
The preceding discussion of the BHA receivership and the Boston school desegregation case is 
intended to provide a context for understanding what needs to be done to preserve the simple 
justice gains made as a result of court intervention. The relinquishment of active court 
supervision provides an opportunity, mentioned earlier, for executive and legislative action, 
which assures that the courts will not have to reassert their authority. Although controversy will 
continue to exist over whether or not the efforts of either Judge Garrity “worked,” concern over 
the fate of the schools and public housing could be more productively directed toward initiatives 
which commit the provision of municipal services to principles of fairness and dignity, thus 
precluding the reentry of the courts into public administration. 
 
Restorative Law and the Boston Public Schools 
It’s been eleven years since the liability opinion was issued in the school desegregation case. 
Since then, there have been many changes in conditions of schooling in Boston that have helped 
bring the system into greater compliance with constitutional requirements. These changes—the 
increased level of electoral responsiveness achieved through district representation, the internal 
managerial reforms initiated by former superintendent Wood and continued by former 
superintendent Spillane, the demographic shifts affecting the school system’s population and 
constituents, the current attention to public education which supports new partnerships between 
the school system and other important sectors—provided the federal district court with 
confidence that the parties to the case could find common ground for resolving outstanding 
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issues: hence the consent decree process throughout 1981–82 and the transitional disengagement 
phase of 1983–85. 
The transitional phase of State Board monitoring was essentially smooth. Still to be 
determined, however, is the appropriate administrative configuration once the court enters its 
final judgment. What are the administrative conditions most conducive to School Department 
autonomy which also promote the quality and equality goals of the court? 
The propositions in the following sections are made with the hope that they will contribute to 
a dialogue about making government work. 
 
Fixing Accountability: Strengthening the Superintendency 
One chronic problem affecting the School Department concerns the constraints on the managerial 
authority of the superintendent.
24
 Prior to 1978, the superintendent had no control over business, 
facilities, or clerical operations; these functions reported directly to the School Committee. With 
the passage in 1978 of Chapter 333, the formal powers of the superintendent were strengthened: 
All department operations were brought under the jurisdiction of the superintendent; the middle-
management tier of associate superintendents was abolished; cabinet-level senior staff units were 
created; and the superintendent was given the authority to dismiss certain senior staff members 
without School Committee approval.
25
 Chapter 333 also provided a mandate for further 
reorganization of key managerial operations.  
It soon became apparent, however, to those in the superintendent’s office that Chapter 333 
was more sizzle than steak. While it represented a step in the direction of improved managerial 
accountability, it did not provide the superintendent with discretionary authority in personnel or 
certain budget areas. The School Committee retains the power of appointment for all categories 
of personnel and the power of dismissal for most. The committee also retains authority over the 
award of all contracts, and continues to remain involved in certain expenditure-control 
procedures. Given the legacy of patronage and the minimal educational inclinations of many 
previous committee members, continued involvement of the committee in these aspects of 
department operations carries potentially unprofessional consequences.  
Every Boston superintendent has learned this over the past ten years. On July 31, 1985, Dr. 
Laval Wilson became Boston’s new school superintendent. His appointment provides an 
opportunity for a redefinition of the position. 
 
Proposition 1: Chapter 333 should be revised in order to strengthen the managerial 
authority of the superintendent  
The proper role of the School Committee is to set citywide educational policy and oversee 
general system adherence to stated policy objectives. The School Committee should function as 
trustee or steward of the Boston public schools, not as manager. With the expansion of the 
committee from five members to thirteen, the need for distinguishing between policy-making and 
policy-implementing responsibilities became more critical. As we have seen in the past several 
months, the behavior or style of some incumbents is not enough to safeguard the School 
Department from committee meddling. There needs to be structural reinforcement of managerial 
authority so that coherence and accountability in department operations can be achieved. 
In 1974, the U.S. District Court declared that the Boston public schools were unlawfully 
segregated and that such segregation was the product of purposeful and intentional behavior on 
the part of the School Committee. The allocation of resources and the hiring and placement of 
personnel were two major categories within which deliberate violations of constitutional 
principles were said to have occurred. In 1985, these managerial functions still reside with the 
committee, in spite of the trend toward decentralization as represented by school-based 
management. While overall allocation of resources is clearly one of the general policy 
responsibilities of the School Committee, excessive or minute interference can be confusing and 
demoralizing. Judge Garrity’s disengagement order of 1985 restores executive authority to the 
School Department. Genuine executive authority should be restored to the superintendent’s 
office, and, in turn, that authority could be more genuinely delegated to the local level as the 
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result of a new home rule petition that would revise the provisions of Chapter 333. 
 
Maintaining Professionalism: The Need for a Comprehensive Planning Function 
In addition to the problem of segmented administrative authority, another chronic managerial 
problem affecting School Department operations is the absence (or inadequacy) of a 
comprehensive planning function. Currently, responsibilities for long-range planning are ad hoc 
and scattered throughout several offices; no office or unit is formally designated to reconcile 
individual long-range projections—in areas such as curriculum, facilities, professional support, 
personnel, budget, and so on—with system-wide objectives and priorities. 
Furthermore, given the deficiency in the strategic planning capacity, there continues to be an 
absence of reliable information concerning the effects of various educational initiatives taken in 
the past few years. Responsibilities for testing and evaluation have been shuffled around; a 
variety of programs (externally funded as well as city funded) have been installed and left to 
function without being integrated into regular operations; policy pronouncements have emanated 
from either the committee or the superintendent’s office with little rationale to back them up. 
Like most public agencies, the School Department experiences great difficulty when it comes to 
assessments of programmatic initiatives. 
 
Proposition 2: A senior-level planning office should be established within the School 
Department for the purpose of allowing the system seriously to address long-range 
educational policy objectives in light of resource availability and desegregation 
considerations. 
A department-based planning office would promote greater autonomy on another front as well: 
Since current public attention on education is likely to result in a number of proposals resembling 
‘‘quick fix’’ solutions rather than serious propositions for improving educational quality, school 
districts are more vulnerable than ever to the whims of public opinion, political forces, private 
ventures, and popular trends. Coupled with greater mayoral and City Council interest in school 
operations, a real need exists for the sort of informed and balanced perspective a well-structured 
and well-staffed planning office could provide. 
 
Restorative Law and Equal Protection 
The focus of this analysis has been on the special circumstances of court-agency relations that 
promote court disengagement and eventual administrative normalization. “Getting the court out” 
is taken as a desirable objective, but it carries attendant assumptions about what a system and its 
leadership need to do to make court withdrawal happen. After all, court intervention in the first 
place occurred as the result of institutional behavior that violated somebody’s rights. 
Court disengagement can occur only with the knowledge that the institution has somehow 
changed, and that individual or group rights will not be violated again. 
This article has laid out some structural administrative considerations for the return of 
executive power to the Boston public schools. There are, of course, other considerations 
conducive to judicial restoration of executive power: changes in the public mood; leadership 
personalities and styles; greater political access; public awareness, through the media or other 
vehicles, about the operations of public systems; and the development of alternative mechanisms 
for resolving conflict without always having to go to court. 
The presence of a new mayoral administration and an expanded City Council and School 
Committee represent a turning point in the management of public affairs in Boston. The entry of 
newcomers into City Hall and Court Street who care about making government work for people 
in the neighborhoods throughout the city contributes greatly to institutional accountability and the 
restoration of public trust. By all accounts, we are likely to see greater involvement with and 
commitment to the provision of public services that are professional and fair. We are, perhaps, on 
the verge of an era in which Boston will become known as a city that cares for its people in truly 
nondiscriminatory terms and whose public agenda has shifted from equity to economic concerns. 
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The forces at work seem to point in this direction. 
The hostilities that were directed toward Asians during the summer of 1985 indicate that 
prejudice has not disappeared within the City of Boston. Racial incidents continue, and the list of 
minority groups discriminated against expands. In the summer of 1984 the Boston City Council 
passed a human rights ordinance that outlawed individual or institutional behavior which occurs 
in a discriminatory fashion. Still needed, however, is an enforcement mechanism for the 
ordinance’s provisions. 
There have been many proposals over the years for the creation of a city agency endowed 
with the authority to investigate and prosecute charges of discrimination. These proposals are 
worth considering, especially given the deëmphasis on federal enforcement of civil rights 
protection. 
 
Proposition 3: An Office of Equal Protection within City Hall should be established and 
charged with responsibilities for monitoring the performance of all city agencies, resolving 
disputes that are the result of complaints and, if necessary, making case referral to the 
Corporation Counsel for litigation on matters pertaining to the violation of individual or 
group rights as outlined in relevant federal, state, and local laws and regulations.  
Such an office should be staffed with individuals who are knowledgeable about public 
bureaucratic behavior and skilled in such areas as mediation, bargaining, and negotiation. 
Reporting directly to the mayor, the office should have guaranteed access to information, data, 
and records and should operate in an “inspector general” fashion. Besides responding to specific 
grievances, the office would provide periodic public reports on city performance with regard to 
the protection of human rights and the promotion of equal opportunity. 
There are several local groups—as well as regional offices of federal agencies—that are 
active in the areas of human rights and affirmative action. These groups provide important 
pressure and are a source of valuable information as to ways in which government can be made 
more accessible. What they lack is the credibility and clout a highly placed, internally based 
office can provide. Mayoral establishment of an Office of Equal Protection could draw upon 
numerous resources from throughout the city and mobilize them to fruitful action. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of court-agency relations in Boston is incomplete. While the school case and the 
public housing case represent the most dramatic forms of court intervention, there are other 
examples. Federal court involvement continues regarding facilities at the Charles Street Jail; still 
unresolved in this case are conditions affecting improvement and location of the facilities. Similar 
problems continue to exist at the Deer Island House of Correction, which is currently operating 
under the terms of a consent decree. 
In another area, a dramatic example of court involvement with the management of public 
affairs concerned Boston Harbor. As a result of a suit filed against the Metropolitan District 
Commission (MDC) by the City of Quincy, former superior court judge Paul G. Garrity 
appointed a master in the summer of 1983 to work with the parties to develop harbor cleanup 
proposals. Underlying the problems affecting the harbor was an enormous lack of 
intergovernmental cooperation. Both federal and state agencies were remiss in maintaining the 
harbor, according to the Conservation Law Foundation (CLP). The CLP filed suit in federal court 
against both the state and federal governments for failure to curb harbor pollution. For years, the 
MDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have failed to produce either plans 
or a timetable for cleaning up the harbor. State court action was therefore sought to force 
development of such plans, as well as to cause jurisdictional cooperation. 
Harvard Law Professor Charles M. Haar, the court-appointed master, attempted to negotiate 
a remedial plan among the parties. One by-product of these efforts—aided by the support of state 
Senate President William Bulger and the work of a gubernatorial harbor study commission first 
headed by former governor Francis Sargent—was a legislative bill that created a Massport-like 
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Metropolitan Water Resources Authority. The Authority was given responsibilities for initiating 
and maintaining a massive cleanup effort serving forty-three communities and featuring the 
transfer of relevant personnel and equipment from the MDC. 
The legislation languished for almost the entire year, not an unusual fate for such a reform-
oriented proposal. By the fall of 1984, Judge Paul Garrity’s response to this inertia was to take a 
highly public profile and threaten court receivership if the legislature did not act. This colorful 
display of judicial power worked; the bill creating the Water Resources Authority was passed, the 
eleven- member board appointed, and an interim director appointed in February 1985. A 
permanent director was expected to be named by the end of the summer. If the court had not 
acted in response to legislative inaction, there probably would be no administrative structure to 
clean up the harbor. 
A bias running throughout this article is the belief that public administrators and other 
officials should discharge their duties in a manner that precludes the necessity of court 
intervention and oversight. Sometimes, however, those elected or appointed to public office are 
unwilling to perform, or incapable of performing, in accordance with certain constitutionally or 
statutorily based standards. As a result, lawsuits are filed, claims are made, and judicial action is 
sought to reform agency operations. While the consequences of such reform initiatives are 
multiple and public reactions to them mixed, few judges enjoy their managerial role. Speaking to 
the senior executive program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Judge William 
Wayne Justice described the averse judicial attitude toward executive intervention: 
 
I believe that I echo the sentiments of all the so-called activist federal judges, 
throughout the country, when I tell you I had just as soon have a live rattle- snake 
thrust at me as a lawsuit dealing with constitutional claims against an 
administrative agency.
26
 
 
Restorative Law and Administrative Normalization: Some Principles 
What are we to conclude about the intergovernmental system if, as often is the case in Boston, 
one branch constantly is intervening into the other? Beyond the aforementioned structural 
propositions, what more general principles or conclusions might we draw from recent state and 
federal court efforts to restore administrative authority to local officials? What are the optimal 
conditions for court disengagement? 
An important issue to remember is the centrality of the court-agency relationship. 
Institutional reform may occur piecemeal and with the participation of many actors, but it occurs 
in remedial cases as the result of court decrees. Making interpretations of rights and 
responsibilities, a court directs an agency to act in accordance with its perception of the agency’s 
capacity to do a better job. Judicial style may vary, but the intent is the same: to provide sanctions 
on administrative practices so that a system operates without violating certain guaranteed rights. 
As there are several populations affected by court decrees, it is easy to dismiss the primacy 
of the court-agency relationship. The plaintiff population and various groups that provide legal 
representation to plaintiffs or that represent plaintiffs’ interests are, of course, crucial; until their 
rights are vindicated, a case remains active. Another sector affected by court decrees is what has 
been termed a secondary population: comprising public officials, the media, special interest 
groups, and public opinion (or, more specifically, public concerns about judicial policies), this 
group is not directly involved with remedial law cases but strongly influences them—and is 
influenced by them.
27
 
Within Boston, members of the secondary population often are vocal in their opinions about 
court and agency behavior. One sometimes wonders, in fact, whether a sort of tradition has 
developed whereby courts are expected to withstand criticism and intervene, handling 
administrative hot potatoes others are more reluctant to deal with. 
The point to be made is that although members of a secondary population are not directly 
affected by or involved with carrying out judicial policies, their response to the court-agency 
interplay carries a great deal of weight. Public statements made by the mayor, news coverage and 
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editorials in the local media and press, the behavior of the state legislature and government, the 
efforts of the private sector—all of these forces contribute to a court’s assessment of the readiness 
of the community in general and the agency in particular to take back management responsibility. 
One generalization, then, to be made about court disengagement is that there needs to be 
some evidence, expressed by members of the secondary population, of commitment to the public 
provision of services which are both equitable and just. This demonstration of essential 
agreement with basic principles governing the remedial regime provides assurance to a court that 
the environment can provide sanctions on administrative behavior without the necessity of active 
judicial oversight. 
The nature of the secondary population’s role leads to a second generalization: the greater the 
extent to which it can provide assistance to the agency in the post-remedial phase, the greater the 
likelihood of disengagement. For example, the involvement of the business and finance 
communities with the Boston public schools generates much-needed local support but also sets a 
standard for further interaction. The same can be said for the involvement of The Boston 
Foundation with the city’s schools and the Housing Authority. The commitment and engagement 
of civic leaders to the restoration of public services constitutes a public-private partnership of the 
highest order; this fortification, upon emergence from court oversight, is essential to the growth 
and well-being of an autonomous system. After all, it took years of neglect and isolation to 
establish the characteristics of those systems destined for court intervention. 
A third generalization with regard to executive recovery concerns the implementing agency. 
As we have seen, agencies often are limited in their capacity to implement judicial decrees. An 
agency’s tradition and policy preference, resource base, and organizational characteristics all 
contribute to its capacity to comply with remedial principles. One would expect that, if anything, 
the remedial phase would have fostered new organizational values, patterns, and behaviors; 
ideally, these new traits could withstand the transition to a post-remedial state. The apparent 
internalization of new attitudes and practices becomes another measure, then, of system readiness 
to regain its authority. The educational function of the remedial phase—that is, the extent to 
which it helps an organization focus on changing its ways—helps determine the extent of this 
internalization and whether or not it can last. 
Related to this is another generalization regarding court disengagement. In both the school 
desegregation and public housing cases, the court signaled its intent to withdraw and then provide 
an interim transition period aimed at closure. There were differences in the transition process 
used just as there were differences in the mode of intervention, but in each case it was necessary 
to formalize an interim period. It is not easy to move a system from dependence to independence 
overnight; both courts and agencies need to recognize that divorce needs to be preceded by a 
period of trial separation. 
During the interim transitional period, the presence of a set of monitoring procedures 
provides a gauge as to organizational readiness to absorb greater responsibilities. As with State 
Board monitoring of the Boston public schools, the monitoring process needs to generate 
information about what has been accomplished with regard to compliance. In addition, as was 
learned by the State Board, the monitoring process must be oriented toward institutional self-
sufficiency. This forward-looking characteristic of institutional review is a tricky one for a 
regulatory agency to maintain; the State Board sometimes lost sight of this part of its role. 
Therefore, a fifth generalization regarding court disengagement is that the monitoring period 
should be specifically directed toward agency autonomy. Maintaining the tension between 
oversight and deliverance requires special skills and procedures; a clear understanding of the 
monitoring mandate permits a more effective deployment of staff resources. The evaluation 
process should be carried out by individuals who recognize their educational responsibilities as 
well. 
Perhaps the most visible characteristic of the disengagement process affecting the school 
desegregation case was the active participation of the parties in the negotiation process. It took 
months before the attorneys representing the parties, accustomed as they were to courtroom 
ritual, could develop a productive negotiating style. Indeed, the adversarial process does not lend 
itself easily to long range policy formulation, especially when it is carried out by representatives 
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of key actors. Two more generalizations, therefore, are that elements of the negotiation process 
should be understood by the parties from the outset, and a commitment to this process should be 
obtained and maintained. The consent decree process in the school case was crippled by the 
uneven participation of plaintiff attorneys. A commitment to participate fully in negotiations for 
modification of court orders might have speeded up the disengagement process. 
Finally, a major lesson emerging from the remedial experience is the need for greater 
knowledge and experience of the world of the court and the world of public management. While 
it may sound trite, the language, customs, and procedures of these two worlds are different. In the 
remedial and post-remedial stages of institutional reform litigation, the two worlds are bound 
together in a manner that can be irritating. To achieve the desired status of institutional 
compliance and self-sufficiency, there must be more intelligence on both sides of the bench. A 
final generalization, then, is that public managers, judges, and lawyers should be made aware of 
the subtleties and requirements of both the world of judicial review and the world of public 
management. In this way, the precepts of the Constitution and the public interest will be better 
served. 
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